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REMEMBERING DISPUTED SEXUAL
ENCOUNTERS: A NEW FRONTIER FOR
WITNESS MEMORY RESEARCH
DEBORAH DAVIS* & ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS**
This paper reviews sources o f distortion in memory for sexual
encounters, particularly those between intoxicated participants. We review
factors leading to initial misinterpretations o f sexual consent including the
indirect nature o f sexual consent communications, misleading cultural
sexual scripts, misinterpretation o f passivity, and others. In this context, we
consider the way in which alcohol can both contribute to initial
misunderstanding and promote specific distortions in memory over time.
Finally, we discuss additional influences on memory, including motivations
related to self-esteem, self-concept maintenance, or litigation, and the effects
o f social influence from sources such as friends, forensic inter\>iewers or
therapists.
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In t r o d u c t i o n
“What do you do when two young people—both drunk and amorous—have sex that
neither completely remembers, both belatedly regret and each sees through a different
lens the morning after?”
Sandy Banks, Los Angeles Times, July 10, 20141

What do you do? This question, raised by Los Angeles Times reporter
Sandy Banks, lies at the heart of a host of cases of alleged sexual assault.
How does one adjudicate such cases when available evidence lies
exclusively, or almost exclusively, in the reports of witnesses with
compromised perception and memory? And how do you do this when the
cases are tinged with motivations and biases that can significantly distort the
fuzzy memories that both parties have? Is there reason to believe that people

1 Sandy Banks, A Campus Judgment Call: Students and Colleges, a Lesson in
Accountability: Being Drunk Could Lead to But Doesn t Excuse Sexual Misbehavior—-for
Either Gender, L.A. T imes, July 10, 2014, at A2.
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in such circumstances might be particularly susceptible to false memories of
the encounter? We suggest that there are good reasons to believe they may
be. We review evidence to support this claim and identify pathways to honest
false testimony in cases of disputed sexual assault.
As context for understanding how honest discrepancies in memory for
sexual interactions might arise, consider the case of a woman we will call
Helen, and her alleged rapist, who we will call Jerry:
Helen and Jerry met during their first year of college and dated for about
six months before breaking up. The break-up was reported by both as not
hostile and as motivated largely by Jerry’s impending departure. Jerry left at
the end of that year for financial reasons and attended a college in his
hometown for the next year. During the fall of their third year in college,
Helen unexpectedly encountered Jerry at a fraternity party. He had returned
to complete his final two years.
Helen was surprised and pleased to see Jerry. She had a lot of genuine
affection for him, but she had just started dating a new boyfriend—Hans—
and was very interested in pursuing that relationship. Hans was out of town
for the weekend and couldn’t attend the party. Helen began the evening by
having several drinks with her sorority sisters before going to the fraternity
party around 8:30 p.m.
Helen encountered Jerry shortly after she arrived. She hugged him
enthusiastically and told him how glad she was to see him. Throughout the
evening they stuck close together and were reported by others as having
seemed physically affectionate and very interested in one another. They
danced together and sat together (sometimes with limbs entwined). Both
agreed that they had talked intimately, reminiscing a lot about old times (as
well as new things in their lives). Both agreed that Helen told Jerry about
Hans and her hopes for that relationship. Jerry told Helen about two women
he had been dating and about which one he thought he was likely to pursue.
Both consumed more alcohol and, eventually, left the party together at
around 11 p.m.
As they left the party, Jerry asked Helen to come to his new place. He
reported he just wanted to show it to her because he was proud of the place
and what he had done with it. She agreed, and they went to his place, where
they continued to drink and talk. Jerry pointed out some of the things he had
when they were together, and they talked more about old memories,
including their mutual enjoyment of their past sexual activities. This was
amid other talk of their new partners as well.
As to how the evening proceeded, Helen and Jerry agree on the
following: It became late, and Helen felt very tired. Jerry encouraged her to
stay and offered to sleep on the couch. Helen refused and insisted that she
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would sleep on the couch. Jerry got in bed and told Helen that she really
didn’t have to sleep on the couch because there was room enough for both in
bed. Helen reiterated that she would sleep on the couch, but after going to the
bathroom in Jerry’s room, she flopped into bed with him and snuggled close
to Jerry.
Their accounts began to diverge considerably at this point. Helen later
claimed that she believed it was clear she had no intention to have sex with
Jerry. She had told him about Hans and her intentions to pursue that
relationship. She had told him she thought it was possible that Hans was “the
one.” She also said she made it clear that she only stayed because they were
both so tired and drunk that neither felt like going anywhere. She believed
Jerry meant that she should come to bed because it would be more
comfortable, not because they would have sex; he had talked about his new
girlfriends, too. Helen thought of Jerry at this point like a best friend, kind of
like a girlfriend you could be yourself with, rather than a boyfriend or sex
partner. She said she had told him as she got into bed to remember that she
was taken, and to keep his hands off her.
Jerry, on the other hand, would later say that he felt that Helen clearly
wanted to have sex with him. Jerry stipulated that Helen had told him about
Hans. But he also noted that all evening she had been very affectionate and
intimate with him. They had talked about sexual topics, including sex
between them (which they agreed had been great). She had come to his place
and continued to be affectionate and drink with him even when they were
alone. And, even though they talked about who should sleep on the couch,
he didn’t think either of them were serious—just teasing and being coy.
When Helen got into bed with him, this seemed to remove any doubt.
Helen agreed that she snuggled up against Jerry but said that, to her, it
was simply snuggling with him like a big brother. At first, Jerry stroked her
affectionately on her anus and shoulders as she drifted off. She felt very
drunk and began to drift out of consciousness, awaking to find that Jerry had
removed her clothes and was performing oral sex on her. She realized she
felt somewhat aroused by what he was doing but was nevertheless shocked
and didn’t want to have intercourse. But Jerry either misinterpreted or
disregarded her startled reaction and outcry and moved up to kiss and enter
her. He was very aroused and grunted or moaned loudly as he moved, shortly
thereafter having an orgasm. Helen felt a number of emotions during
intercourse: arousal, distress, guilt, fear about her relationship with Hans, and
others.
Helen reported that she was shocked and distressed, and that she tried
to resist. But Jerry was a foot taller than Helen and weighed over two hundred
pounds, and she felt that her resistance was completely futile, as Jerry’s
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weight moved and thrust on top of her slight, one-hundred-pound body. She
said she cried out for him to stop, but he didn’t. Helen felt she had clearly
said no, before and after he entered her. Helen also reported that she was very
drunk and that when she first opened her eyes, it took her a moment to realize
what he was doing and to mobilize herself to resist. She claimed that she
managed to put her hands on his chest to try to push him away, but by then it
was too late. Jerry finished, and soon kissed her, moved off her, pulled her
close by his side, and fell asleep.
Jerry, in contrast, reported that Helen seemed completely on board with
what they were doing. He agreed with her account that he began by stroking
her arms and shoulders. He recounted, however, that she sighed and seemed
to enjoy it. After all, she had gotten in bed with and snuggled up to him, and
this happened after the many behaviors throughout the evening that seemed
very consistent with her being interested in sex. Jerry admitted that he was
intoxicated, too, but became aroused rather than tired with Helen, who was
very attractive, in bed with him. He acknowledged that she had talked about
Hans, but given her other behaviors, he assumed she was okay with extra
relationship sex, or that maybe she would want him instead. He said he had
no idea and that there was no indication that Helen wanted to restrict their
rekindled relationship to friendship. To him, it felt like they had never broken
up.
As they lay in bed, Jerry reported that Helen was making sounds of
pleasure with everything he did. As he moved from stroking her anns to
touching her more intimately, she didn’t protest. She didn’t open her eyes but
seemed to respond with arousal to his touch by making more sounds of
pleasure. As he moved from performing oral sex to intercourse, she opened
her eyes, sat up a little, gasped, and put her hands against his chest. But he
interpreted these things as arousal and participation. He didn’t see indications
of resistance or distress. Once intercourse began, he said he heard her say
something but didn’t really know what it was, because he was fully aroused
and making noise himself. He thought she was just expressing enjoyment.
For her part, Helen didn’t remember the sounds Jerry said she made until
Jerry began intercourse. She reported that she was basically unconscious and
intoxicated, and if those sounds happened at all, they didn’t reflect her
feelings about the sex.
Helen didn’t accuse Jerry that night. She cried for a while as he slept,
then fell back asleep herself. Jerry took her home the next morning, and to
him, nothing seemed amiss. But within the week, she had reported him to
campus authorities and police, claiming that she did not consent to the sex
and that she was too intoxicated to consent. With these reports, Helen began
a complicated saga for herself, Jerry, and those on campus and in the legal
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system faced with the task of disentangling the truth from lies, and honest
mistakes of memory and interpretation.
As is common for cases of disputed sexual consent such as that of Helen
and Jerry, their legal dispute turned on four primary issues. First, did Helen
feel that she had voluntarily participated in the sexual encounter? Second,
regardless of Helen’s subjective sense of voluntariness, what would a
reasonable man conclude regarding her consent, given her behavior at the
time? Third, how intoxicated was Helen? Did she pass the threshold of her
ability to reasonably consent to the encounter? And finally, regardless of
Helen’s actual level of intoxication, would it be reasonably apparent to Jerry
that she was too intoxicated to consent?
Investigators and others who must judge these issues have to rely on
“memory” evidence. That evidence consists of Helen and Jerry’s memory
reports and those of the other witnesses: reports relevant to the voluntariness
of the sexual encounter, reports relating to Helen’s level of intoxication (the
amount of alcohol or other drugs consumed), and memory reports about
behaviors that might reflect Helen’s level of intoxication (such as slurring
speech, stumbling, or struggling to perform other physical activity).
Cases such as Helen and Jerry’s are commonplace on and off campuses
around the country and have recently fueled the intense press coverage of
campus sexual assault.2 This coverage has raised awareness of the many
issues facing those who must judge the claims, and has provoked discussion
of the appropriate way for campuses to investigate and adjudicate them.
Whether campus authorities or police and criminal courts pursue these
claims, the evidence all must rely on will come largely, sometimes
exclusively, in the form of memory-based witness accounts. Through these
witnesses, fact-finders must judge complicated issues of the nature of sexual
consent, how it is communicated, and how it is understood.
Though the circumstances of sexual interactions—and particularly
those involving intoxicated participants—provide fertile ground for memory
failure and distortion, little memory research has directly addressed memory
for sexual interactions. Here, we hope to provide a call to arms for memory
researchers to dive into this complicated, challenging, yet vitally important
arena.
What can memory scientists offer to facilitate understanding of the
See, e.g., Abbie Nehring, Campus Sexual Assault: What Are Colleges Doing Wrong?,
of Change (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.nationofchange.org/campus-sexual-assaultwhat-are-colleges-doing-wrong-1407164768; Teresa Watanabe, 55 U.S. Schools Facing Title
IXInquiry, L.A. T imes, May 2, 2014, at AA1; Cathy Young, Columbia Student: IDidn ’t Rape
Her, T he Daily B east, (Feb. 3, 2015, 5:55 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2015/02/03/columbia-student-i-didn-t-rape-her.html.
N ation
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many challenges facing witnesses asked to report information regarding the
four major issues entailed in cases such as that of Helen and Jerry? We
structure our analysis much as many witness memory researchers might
testify in court. That is, we consider three broad phases at which memory
might fail: encoding, storage, and retrieval.
Encoding occurs when infonnation is originally perceived and
transferred into long-term memory.3 Storage is the retention of a memory
during the interval between original encoding of the event and the eventual
memory recollection.45Retrieval, the final phase, occurs when the stored
infonnation is recalled and reported.''
Sexual consent interactions pose many of the same challenges for
memory as other events. And yet, they are also in some respects unique.
Similarly, though intoxication can compromise memory for any event, it can
compromise memory for relevant information in sexual assault cases in
somewhat unique ways. About half of reported and unreported sexual
assaults occur when the accused, accuser, or both had consumed alcohol.6
Moreover, additional witnesses may themselves be intoxicated.
Here, we address features of sexual consent interactions that we suggest
pose relatively unique memory challenges for participants and witnesses—
particularly for those intoxicated during the relevant events.
I. C h a l l e n g e s a t E n c o d in g : F a il u r e s o f P e r c e p t io n a n d
I n t e r p r e t a t io n

To reliably report on any event, the perceiver must first be able to
perceive the event accurately and encode it successfully into long-term
memory. Successful and accurate encoding requires both the opportunity to
observe as well as correct interpretation of what one observes. These
perceptions must also be successfully transferred to and consolidated in long3 Classification o f Memory, Encylopedia of the H uman B rain (V.S. Ramachandran,
ed„ 2002).'
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 For reviews, see, for example, Antonia Abbey, Alcohol’s Role in Sexual Violence
Perpetration: Theoretical Explanations, Existing Evidence and Future Directions, 30 D rug
& A lcohol R ev. 481, 481 (2011); Antonia Abbey et al., Sexual Assault and Alcohol
Consumption: What Do We Know About Their Relationship and What Types o f Research Are
Still Needed?, 9 Aggression & V iolent B ehav. 271, 275-77 (2004); Michael C. Seto &
Edward E. Barbaree, The Role o f Alcohol in Sexual Aggression, 15 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. R ev,
545, 549-61 (1995); Maria Testa, The Impact o f Men's Alcohol Consumption on Perpetration
o f Sexual Aggression, 22 C linical P sychol. Rev . 1239, 1244-56 (2002); Rose Marie Ward,
et al., Alcohol and Sexual Consent Scale: Development and Validation, 36 Am . J. OF H ealth
Behav. 746,747 (2012).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2906490

818

DAVIS &LOFTUS

[Vol. 105

term memory. Each of these requirements poses challenges for the parties
and witnesses in sexual assault cases, particularly if intoxicated.
As we explore in the following Sections, there are several relatively
unique challenges of encoding for such cases. The first concerns the range of
relevant information witnesses will be asked to remember. The second
concerns the limitations of human attention and observation. The last
concerns the risks of misinterpretation of sexual communications, indicators
of sexual intentions and indicators of intoxication. We discuss each of these
with attention to the effects of intoxication.
A. THE DEPTH AND COMPLEXITY OF THE MEMORY TASK FACING
PARTICIPANTS
Once a claim of sexual assault has been made, the two parties and other
witnesses are typically faced with extensive demands for detail by
investigators. What intoxicating substances did participants ingest, how
much, and when did they do so? How did they behave that might reflect the
degree of intoxication? What, exactly, did each participant say and do to try
to initiate sexual activity, to solicit consent, or to grant or deny consent?
When did these communications occur, and were they overt statements,
facial expressions, body postures and reactions, or what? What else occurred
that might reflect the accuser’s willingness to engage in sex, either during the
occasion in question or in the past? Accused and accuser may also be asked
to recall emotions, reactions to and interpretations of the other’s behaviors
and statements, his or her own intentions, and other subjective thoughts (as
they occurred at the time). Other witnesses can be asked similar questions.
1. The Time Course and Complexity Through Which Consent Unfolds
In addition to what occurred on the day or night of the event in question,
other information concerning the long-term history of interactions between
the two parties can be relevant to whether lack of consent was clearly
communicated, or could have been reasonably interpreted as such by the
accused. Sexual consent is sometimes conveyed over very long periods of
time as acquaintance, friendship, attraction and flirtation gradually develop
and escalate to sexual interactions, or as preliminary sexual activities such as
kissing escalate to intercourse. Each party, and sometimes other witnesses,
may take into account behaviors and communications that took place across
many different interactions in many different contexts when assessing the
likelihood that one or both of the parties are interested in having intercourse
at a specific time. Both parties and witnesses are likely to be asked a great
deal of contextual information regarding the time period preceding the
alleged assault (including much historical data about the relationship), as
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well as many details of specific statements and behaviors of each party during
the period of their acquaintance, and leading up to and during the alleged
assault.
In some cases, consent may have been granted in advance, such as when
the accused and accuser may have agreed to have sex before becoming
intoxicated. However, consent is ongoing, and does not end when sexual
activities, even intercourse, begin. So in such instances the question may
become what had happened that may (or may not) have communicated that
consent had been withdrawn.

2. The Complexities o f Judging Intoxication
The tasks of interpreting and remembering one’s own and others’ levels
of intoxication are also critical to many claims of sexual assault. While
objective assessment of an accuser’s level of intoxication may be possible in
some cases, in many others the alleged assault is reported too long after the
event for such objective assessments as blood alcohol levels. Instead,
judgment of the accuser’s intoxication must rest on witness reports. Yet, like
memory for consent interactions, memory for ingestion and intoxication can
be complex, difficult, and subject to error.
The task, again, is complex. Consider the following jury instructions
regarding adjudication of an alleged case of rape by intoxication. First, the
jury is given the basic task to judge intoxication: “If [alleged victim] was
incapable of giving consent, and if the accused knew or had reasonable cause
to know that [alleged victim] was incapable of giving consent because she
was [asleep, unconscious, intoxicated], the act of sexual intercourse was done
by force and without consent.”7
Note that the instruction includes two issues: (1) was the victim
incapable of giving consent (due to sleep, unconsciousness and/or
intoxication), and (2) did the accused have reasonable cause to know that the
victim was incapacitated? Each of these requires that the person must encode
a wide range of cues (and interpret them correctly) to answer appropriately.
Given the challenges of observation and memory of the amount the
accuser ingested, the accused can be faced with the necessity of relying
partially or fully on behavioral cues of the victim’s intoxication. In many
cases, such as where the accused and accuser had been present at social
events prior to the alleged assault, other witnesses may be faced with the
same issue.
Consider the following jury instructions regarding this issue:
7 United States D ep ’t of the Army, M ilitary Judges’ Benchbook 472 (2010),
available at http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/portals/135/militaryJudges_benchbook.pdf.
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A person is capable of consenting to an act of sexual intercourse unless she is incapable
of understanding the act, its motive, and its possible consequences. In deciding whether
[alleged victim] had consented to the sexual intercourse you should consider all the
evidence in the case, including but not limited to: the degree of the alleged victim’s
intoxication, if any, and or consciousness or unconsciousness and or mental alertness;
the ability or inability of the alleged victim to walk and or to communicate coherently;
whether the alleged victim may have consented to the act of sexual intercourse prior to
lapsing into unconsciousness and or falling asleep; and or any other evidence tending
to show the alleged victim may have been acquiescing to the intercourse rather than
actually being asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unable to consent.8

Note that jurors are asked to consider indicators of intoxication,
including, but not limited to, degree of consciousness, mental alertness, and
ability to walk or communicate clearly. Witnesses are likely to be asked to
report on these and additional indicators, such as out-of-character behavior
or throwing up.
Clearly, the range of information relevant to consent and to intoxication
is extensive, complex, often subtle, and can be easily misinterpreted. Thus,
two memory problems can occur as the result of failures of encoding. That
is, much of the necessary information may never have been attended to or
encoded successfully into memory at all. But even if encoded, some
information may have been misinterpreted, and therefore encoded into
memory incorrectly. We consider each of these in the next two sections.
B. FAILURES OF ATTENTION AND PERCEPTION

The range of information relevant to consent and intoxication can be
sufficiently extensive to challenge the limits of participants’ encoding
abilities, particularly when many relevant behaviors take place in a
complicated social context where accuser, accused, and/or other witnesses
are intoxicated. The first level of this challenge concerns participants’
abilities to perceive relevant information—to have access to it, and to attend
to it. Memory follows the focus of attention such that what is not attended to
is not encoded: a phenomenon referred to as “inattentional blindness.”9
Attention, in turn, is limited and, by necessity, selective such that only a
portion of observable information can be attended to. Most of the available
information, particularly in complex social situations, is never attended to
and never encoded.
This situation can pose considerable challenge for those reporting
information relevant to claims of sexual assault. First, there can be too much
8 Id. (internal parentheses omitted).
Alva Noe, Inattentional Blindness, Change Blindness, and Consciousness, in T he
B lackwell C ompanion to Consciousness 504 (Max Velmans & Susan Schneider eds
2007).
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relevant information to encode. Moreover, much of the relevant information
is hidden and unobservable, and much observable information becomes
important only in hindsight, after the accuser concludes that the sexual
encounter was sexual assault and conveys this claim to others. There may
have been no reason to attend to that information at the time it occurred, and
therefore, there is little or no memory of it later.
1. Attending to Intoxication
If the claim is rape by intoxication, the primary issues can be the level
of the accuser’s intoxication or incapacitation, and the extent to which the
accused would have reasonable cause to recognize that the accuser reached
that level of incapacitation. Memory reports of what the accuser may have
ingested (and when) are relevant to the probability and severity of her
intoxication. Such information may or may not be available to the accused or
other witnesses at all. The accuser’s ingestion may have taken place before
or after she10 encountered them, as happened with Helen for witnesses who
saw her only at the party. Moreover, even if all were together while the
accuser was drinking or taking drugs, the accused (and other witnesses, if
any) may not have noticed or been able to discern the amount ingested. This
is complicated by the fact that ingestion can occur over a considerable period
of time, some of which is observable and some not.
It is worth mentioning that many men and women arrive at fraternity
parties after “pregaming” (drinking in advance of the party),*11 as did Helen.
Some witnesses may have been present for the pregaming but not the party,
and others may have been present only for the party. Still others may have
been present for both. But in reality, none are likely to have observed
precisely, or to possess accurate memories for, the sum total of what was
ingested and the time course over which it was ingested.
Though such information would be, in theory, available to the accuser,
memory for one’s own ingestion can be poor as well. To the extent, for
example, that ingestion takes place over a considerable period of time, and
when more than a couple of drinks are consumed, the accuser may not have
accurately encoded the amount ingested. If at a party, she may be unaware of
all instances or amounts by which her drink was refilled by others, or of the
specific amounts by which she replenished her own drinks. The distractions

10 For the sake of simplicity we refer only to female victim/accusers throughout,
though we acknowledge that males also suffer sexual assault and may be the
accuser in some cases.
11 See, e.g ., A lexandra R obbins, P ledged: T he Secret L ife
(Hyperion Books ed., 2004).
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of the party may further limit her attention to what is being ingested. As
intoxication increases, encoding would be progressively impaired—
particularly for what is not the main focus of attention. Thus, in many cases
the accuser’s memory reports may not be fully accurate regarding what was
ingested and when.
Recall that the parties and witnesses may also be asked about behavioral
reflections of intoxication: such as slurred speech, unsteady walking, and
unusually sexualized or otherwise uncharacteristic behaviors. Whereas
observers, particularly those relatively unfamiliar with the accuser, may be
inclined to rely on comparison of her behavior to that of others, accurate
judgments require historical information about the accuser for comparison to
her current behavior.
2. Attending to Consent
As with intoxication, both parties and other witnesses may be asked
about information relevant to the likelihood the accuser consented to sex, and
that the accused reasonably believed that consent was present. Arguably, the
parties themselves are much more likely to have attended to the relevant
information, as it would be of significantly greater personal relevance and
importance. It is important to note, however, that what is not said or done can
be crucially important to sexual consent communications, whereas attention
will more often go to what is said or done. This is particularly true for
intoxicated participants, whose attention is drawn to salient behaviors and
cues, and who are less likely to access long-term memory to recognize what
is missing.12
Moreover, as with ingestion of intoxicating substances and reflections
of intoxication, much of the relevant information may be inaccessible to the
accused or other witnesses. Was the accuser a virgin versus experienced?
Was she usually open to casual hookups? What was the history of her
relationship with the accused? What might have been done in the past that
indicated escalating or ongoing receptiveness to sex? Was there any
discussion of having sex on this occasion? Answers to these questions could
inform judgments of sexual intentions. Why did Helen, for example, leave
the party with Jerry? Why did she go to his house? And why did she agree to
spend the night? Was it because she wanted to have sex, or because she felt
too drunk or too tired to make the thirty-minute drive home? Even without
historical information about the parties and their previous interactions, cues
to these answers may have been observable during the party that night. But

12 See discussion of effects of intoxication on perception and memory, infra notes 13-19
and accompanying text.
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the many witnesses asked about their behavior with one another then and in
the past may not have paid attention, instead attending to their own
intentions, desires, and other information relevant for them.
All in all, then, considerable risk exists that witnesses will be asked to
report on information they may not have access to at all, or that they were
unlikely to have attended to at the time of the events in question. These
problems are magnified by intoxication.
3. Intoxication, Perception, and Consolidation
Alcohol has general detrimental effects on event memory, particularly
with respect to event details. In part, this is because alcohol can reduce the
clarity of perception and depth with which information is processed, reduce
working memory capacity, and, as a result, reduce the likelihood and detail
with which information is transferred into long-term memory and
consolidated.13 Consequently, memory for the event and its details can be
absent or vague.14
Intoxication can reach the threshold for alcohol-induced blackout15 such
that no memories of the event in question will reach long-term memory at
all, certainly none that are either accurate or reliable.16 However, some
persons can nevertheless develop rich false memories for events during the
blackout17 through processes described in later sections.
13 For reviews of multiple effects of acute alcohol ingestion, see Miriam Z. Mintzer, The
Acute Effects o f Alcohol on Memory: A Review o f Laboratory Studies in Healthy Adults, 6
Int ’l J. on D isability & Hum . Dev . 397,400-01 (2007); Mark Molnar et a l, The Acute Effect
o f Alcohol on Various Memory Processes, 24 J. P sychophysiology 249, 250-51 (2010).
14 E.g., Jennifer E. Dysart, et al., The Intoxicated Witness: Effects o f Alcohol on
Identification Accuracy from Showups. 87 J. Applied P sychol. 170, 174 (2002), Angelica
Hagsand et al., Bottled Memories: On How Alcohol Affects Eyewitness Recall, 54
Scandinavian J. P sychol. 188, 191-93 (2013); Kim van Oorsouw & Harald Merckelbach,
The Effects o f Alcohol on Crime-Related Memories: A Field Study, 26 Applied COGNITIVE
P sychol. 82, 84-86 (2012).
15 See Donald W. Goodwin, Alcohol Amnesia, 90 Addiction 315, 315-16 (1995); Donald
F. Sweeney, Alcohol Versus Mnemosyne—Blackouts, 6 J. S ubstance A buse Treatment 159,
159-62 (1989).
16 It is important to note that multiple substances are often consumed contemporaneously,
which may magnify intoxication, result in complex interactions between substances, and make
it difficult to predict the cognitive impact of the combined doses. Though ingestion of other
drugs is important and can result in similar impairments as alcohol, we restrict our review to
alcohol.
17 G isli H. G udjonsson, T he P sychology of Interrogations and C onfessions: A
Handbook 212-13, 411-12 (2003); Gisli Hannes Gudjonsson et al., The Role o f Memory
Distrust in Cases o f Internalised False Confession, 28 Applied Cognitive P sychol. 336,337
(2014); see also Saul M. Kassin, Internalized False Confessions, in 1 The H andbook of
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Intoxication impairs encoding in part through its impact on what is
attended to, as well as the extent or depth of attention devoted to those aspects
of the event that are attended to. The term “alcohol myopia,” for example,
refers to the tendency during acute alcohol use to narrow the focus of
attention to salient immediate stimuli, at the expense of other contextual
information.18 As noted earlier, memory follows the focus of attention, such
that what is not attended to is not encoded into memory. Moreover, that
which is attended to in less depth is less likely to be encoded at all, and less
likely to be encoded completely or accurately. Thus, much of the very
detailed information witnesses are asked to recount is never encoded and is
not accessible for the witness to report reliably. As we have thus far reviewed,
this is a problem for most witnesses, in that much more information can be
asked for than they would reasonably have encoded successfully during the
event. Alcohol myopia, however, renders such problems greater for the
intoxicated witness. “Inattentional blindness” is greater among the
intoxicated, for example.19
C. FAILURES OF INTERPRETATION AT ENCODING

Even if information is adequately attended to and perceived, it may be
encoded into long-term memory incorrectly. Unfortunately, by nature,
behaviors and communications relevant to sexual consent are often subtle,
ambiguous, and subject to multiple meanings. They are easy to miss and open
to misinterpretation. Similarly, intoxication-relevant behaviors are often
difficult to interpret, as evidenced below. Such ambiguities and opportunity
for subjective judgment are fertile ground for error. This is particularly
problematic, given that, over time, witnesses will remember the “gist” of
what they observed and the conclusions they drew more clearly than the exact
behaviors they observed at the time, as discussed below.
In the following Sections we first address difficulties in interpretation
of sexual intentions and intoxication. We then discuss the ways in which
intoxication and/or strong emotions can further facilitate errors and biases in
interpretation.

E yewitness Testimony: M emory for E vents 169,172-73 (Michael P. Toglia et al. eds.,
2006) (discussing the “internalized false confession” where the suspect comes to believe
falsely that he or she actually did commit the crime).
Claude M. Steele & Robert A. Josephs, Alcohol Myopia: Its Prized and Dangerous
Effects, 45 Am . P sychologist 921, 923. (1990).
Seema L. Clifasefi et al., Blind Drunk: The Effects o f Alcohol on Inattentional
Blindness, 20 A pplied C ognitive P sychol. 697, 702-03 (2006).
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1. Communication and Miscommunication o f Sexual Intentions
Though it is sometimes the case that sexual encounters are proposed and
accepted very directly and explicitly, there are many that are developed over
time, without explicit proposition and acceptance or negotiated through
subtle and indirect means that are open, unfortunately, to misinterpretation.
Research on sexual consent communications has identified three sources of
misunderstanding entailed in such nonexplicit means of communicating
sexual intentions.20
In the following sections we first address these three primary sources of
misunderstanding, including (a) the tendency to use indirect forms of
communication for sexual negotiations, (b) the multiple meanings of many
behaviors reflecting (in part) sexual intentions, and (c) the existence of
misleading cultural scripts reflecting widespread erroneous beliefs
concerning the meaning of behaviors reflecting sexual intentions. We then
consider the way in which the context in which relevant behaviors and
communications take place, and the personal motivations of the participants
can further promote misunderstanding.
a. The problem o f indirect communication. Sexual communications,
particularly those between parties who have not yet had sex, can carry
significant risk. The initiator faces the possibility of rejection. The target
faces several potential problems, including how to accept without seeming
too “easy” or how to reject without damaging the initiator’s feelings. Both
face risks of damaging the relationship or of fundamentally changing its
nature. These must be balanced against the potential opportunity and rewards
of increasing sexual intimacy. For these reasons, sexual negotiations often
take place through indirect means, such as hints, innuendo, nonverbal
behaviors, attempts to increase or display one’s attractiveness, tentative
attempts at sexual contact, and gradual escalation of intimacy. Rejections
may take the form of changing the subject, pretending not to understand the
initiator’s intentions, or other behaviors intended to avoid directly saying
“no.” These have in common the advantage that while they can be interpreted
as sexual invitations or rejections, it is not true that they must be interpreted
as such. Thus, the most threatening interpretation need not be adopted.

20 See, e.g., Deborah Davis & J. Guillermo Villalobos, Language and the Law:
Illustrations from Cases o f Disputed Sexual Consent, in THE OXFORD H andbook OF
L anguage and Social Psychology 438, 442-45 (2014); J. Guillermo Villalobos et al„ His
Story, Her Story: Sexual Miscommunication, Motivated Remembering, and Intoxication as
Pathways to Honest False Testimony Regarding Sexual Consent 4-10 (Univ. San Francisco
Law Res. Paper 2014-33), http://ssm.com/abstract=2480049 (forthcoming in Wrongful
A llegations of Sexual and C hild A buse (Ros Burnett, ed.) (Dec. 2016)).
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Professors James Lee and Steven Pinker formalized and tested these
notions in the context of their theory of the “strategic speaker.” 21 The authors
noted that use of indirect speech provides plausible deniability for the
speaker’s intentions.22 They further provided evidence that speakers are more
prone to use indirect statements when the intended meaning would suggest a
significant change in the nature of the relationship,23 such as from platonic to
sexual.
This dance of ambiguity characteristic of such risky communications
serves to protect the egos of both parties and often to protect their existing
relationship from damage. When necessary, the indirect communications
allow the dyad to continue as if no sexual communications actually took
place. Perhaps, in light of this, it is no surprise that explicit verbal means of
either initiating or rejecting sexual advances are much less common than are
indirect means.24
While, arguably, the actual meaning underlying most indirect
communications is understood, they nevertheless provide opportunity for
misinterpretation. If an indirectly stated sexual advance is missed, the
misunderstanding may cost the initiator a sexual opportunity. But if an
indirectly expressed rejection is misunderstood, the consequences can be
much more severe. Rejection of a would-be romantic partner tends to be
experienced as aversive for the rejector, not just the rejected.25 Women’s
tendencies to communicate refusal via indirect means26 is perhaps most
problematic in that that the man may proceed unchecked, without awareness
that his advances are unwelcome. Or, as some have argued, the man may
pretend to misinterpret the rejection—a claim that may be believed by others

21 See James J. Lee & Steven Pinker, Rationales for Indirect Speech: The Theory o f the
Strategic Speaker, 117 PSYCHOL. Rev . 785 (2010).
22 Id. at 790-91.
23 Id. at 794-96.
"4 Susan E. Hickman & Charlene L. Muehlenhard, “By the Semi-Mystical Appearance of
a Condom How Young Women and Men Communicate Sexual Consent in Heterosexual
Situations, 36 J. Sex Res . 258, 266 (1999); Grace Y. Lim & Michael E. Roloff, Attributing
Sexual Consent, 27 J. A pplied C omm. R es. 1, 2-3 (1999); Lucia F. O’Sullivan & E. Sandra
Byers, College Students ’ Incorporation o f Initiator and Restrictor Roles in Sexual Dating
Interactions, 29 J. Sex R es. 435, 444 (1992); Timothy Perper & David L. Weis, Proceptive
and Rejective Strategies o f U.S. and Canadian College Women, 23 J. Sex R es. 455, 465-66
(1987).
25 Samantha Joel et al., People Overestimate Their Willingness to Reject Potential
Romantic Partners by Overlooking Their Concern for Other People, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 2233,
2239 (2014).
26 See supra note 24.
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who view the indirect response as ambiguous.27
Women (and men as well) widely report that the most common manner
in which they consent to sexual activity is by failing to offer resistance.28
Unfortunately, lack of resistance may also occur when the woman finds the
sexual activity entirely unwelcome or aversive. Some evidence suggests that
active resistance is less likely when the man is an intimate partner, rather than
simply an acquaintance.29 Lack of resistance can reflect socialization of
women to be indirect and submissive (which varies across cultures), shock,
confusion, shame, fear of the man and his reactions, excessive intoxication
and other reasons.30 Reflecting this ambiguity, a man may feel he has a
perfectly willing partner, even as she is horrified and repulsed by the
encounter.
b. The problem o f multiple meaning. Indirect communications are, by
definition, subject to multiple interpretations. But, arguably, any and all
behaviors and statements potentially relating to sexual intentions are subject
to multiple meanings. Even a very explicit statement of desire to have sex
can mean the opposite, such as when a person says, clearly with irony or
sarcasm, “I absolutely want to jump your bones right this minute!”
(accompanied by attempts to throw the person on the bed). But many
behaviors that tend to be perceived as reflecting sexual intentions or desires
have multiple potential meanings, many with no intended relevance to sex at
all.
For instance, many behavioral reflections of liking a person can also be
interpreted as sexual interest, such as animated or intimate conversation,
smiling, touch, physical proximity, spending time alone with the person, and
expressions of interest in the person or what he is saying. Davis and
colleagues, for example, asked men and women to indicate the meaning of
more than 70 behaviors that women might perform in the context of a date
(e.g., drinking or drug use, going somewhere alone, talking about sexual
topics, dressing sexily).31 For each behavior, women indicated whether they
27 E.g., Hickman & Muehlenhard, supra note 24, at 270.
28 Heidi Collins Fantasia, Really Not Even a Decision Any More: Late Adolescent
Narratives o f Implied Sexual Consent, 7 J. F orensic N ursing 120,123-24 (2011); Hickman
& Muehlenhard, supra note 24, at 271.
29 Sarah Ullman & Judith M. Siegel, Victim-Offender Relationship and Sexual Assault, 8
V iolence & Victims 121,132 (1993).
30 Villalobos et al., supra note 20, at 4-10. Charlene L. Muehlenhard et al., Definitions of
Rape: Scientific and Political Implications, 48 J. Soc. ISSUES 23, 30-33 (1992); Jessica
Woodhams et ah, Behavior Displayed by Female Victims During Rapes Committed by Lone
and Multiple Perpetrators, 18 P sychol. P ub . P ol’y & L. 415,419 (2012).
31 Deborah Davis et ah, Seeds o f Rape: Female Behavior Is Probative for Females,
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were more, less, or equally likely to perform the behavior when willing to
have intercourse. They also indicated whether they never, sometimes, or
often performed the behavior when not willing. Men answered the same two
questions regarding what they thought women in general did regarding each
behavior.32
The authors found that women reported that they were more likely to
engage in many of the behaviors when willing to have intercourse. But they
also often reported that they sometimes or often engaged in the behaviors
when not willing.33 Seventy percent of women reported, for example, that
they were more likely to dress in a sexually provocative manner when willing
to have intercourse, whereas 55% also reported that they sometimes or often
did so when not willing.34 Similar results were obtained for a number of other
behaviors commonly viewed as probative of sexual intention, such as
drinking or doing drugs together, going somewhere alone with him and
others.35
Davis and colleagues identified behaviors for which there was most
likely to be misunderstanding. The authors coined the term “rapeseed
quotient” to refer to the likelihood of pairing a woman who sometimes or
often performed the behavior when not willing to have intercourse with a
man who believed that women never did the behavior unless willing to have
intercourse.36 They argued that these were the behaviors most likely to result
in dramatic differences between men and women in understanding and
interpretation of the woman’s sexual intentions.37
Overall, the authors found considerable correspondence between the
interpretations of women and men.38 But there were some behaviors that men
interpreted as more definitive indicators of willingness to have intercourse
than women reported: such as allowing the man to touch her breasts or
genitalia, talking about sexual topics, dressing very sexily, or performing oral
sex.39 For example, 40% of men believed that women perform oral sex if,

Definitive for Males, in American P sych. A ss ’n & C rim . Just. Sect., A m . B ar A ss ’n ,
P sychological E xpertise and Criminal Justice 101,107,122-140 (1999).
32 Id. at 107.
33 See id. at 110, 122-28.
34 Id. at 123.
35 Id. at 124-25.
36 Id. at 107.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 112-13.
39 Id. at 129-34.
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and only if, willing to have intercourse.40 In contrast, 40% of women reported
doing so sometimes or often when not willing.41 Such behaviors have
multiple meanings for women. Women may have oral sex instead of
intercourse for a variety of reasons, including, for example, to avoid
intercourse, to avoid pregnancy, to please the man while not risking
intercourse and others. This behavior then, is one many men tend to interpret
as definitive, whereas women may be thinking differently. For the woman, it
is as far as she is willing to go rather than an indication of how much farther.
But such behaviors are those most likely to result in honest differences of
interpretation, and those mostly likely to be misinterpreted or
“overperceived” as indicating consent by the man, a phenomenon referred to
as the “overperception bias.”42
Notably, while sex differences were minimal for most behaviors, and
men tended to view most behaviors as less definitively indicating willingness
to have sex than women reported to be true of themselves, the picture was
quite different for behaviors involving drugs or alcohol. Men viewed such
behaviors as both more probative and more definitive indicators of
willingness to have intercourse than women reported them to be true for
themselves; and the average rapeseed quotients were significantly higher
than for any other behaviors studied. Such results are consistent with other
research indicating that alcohol use is viewed as associated with sexual
interest (see Section I.C.3.b below). Thus, the very fact of alcohol use may
contribute substantially to honest misunderstandings of sexual intentions. For
example, for the following behaviors, rapeseed quotients indicated that for
20-33% of randomly paired couples, the man would believe that women only
perform the behavior when willing to have intercourse, whereas the woman

40 Id at 132.
41 Id at 128.
42 See Antonia Abbey, Sex Differences in Attributions fo r Friendly Behavior: Do Males
Misperceive Females’ Friendliness?, 42 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 830, 836-38 (1982). For
additional reviews, see Antonia Abbey, Sexual Assault Perpetration by College Men: The Role
o f Alcohol, Misperception o f Sexual Intent, and Sexual Beliefs and Experiences, 17 J. Soc. &
C linical P sychol . 167, 171-72, 185-86 (1998); Betty H. La France et al., Social-Sexual
Interactions? Meta-Analyses o f Sex Differences in Perceptions o f Flirtatiousness,
Seductiveness, and Promiscuousness, 76 C omm . M onographs 263,279-83 (2009). Note that
the existence and extent of an “overperception” bias among men has been recently challenged
by findings of Professors Carin Perilloux and Robert Kurzban. See Carin Perilloux & Robert
Kurzban, Do Men Overperceive Women's Sexual Interest?, 26 P sychol . S ci. 70 (2014)
(finding that when women responded concerning what they believed women would actually
want given the behavior, the two genders responded more similarly, and that both genders
indicated that womens’ true sexual intentions were stronger than what they reported: that
women tended to understate sexual intentions).
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would report that she sometimes or often does it when not willing: get
severely intoxicated in public with a man met that day; get moderately or
severely intoxicated in private with a man met that day; get severely
intoxicated in public or private with a date with whom one has not yet had
sex; get severely intoxicated at a party with no date; leave a party with a
person met that day (whether intoxicated or not); or get moderately to
severely intoxicated with a date using marijuana, cocaine, ecstasy, or
narcotics.43
Given the triple problems that (1) many behaviors are actually probative
of women’s sexual intentions, (2) none are definitive indicators of
willingness, and (3) all are subject to multiple meaning, perceivers can face
a difficult, error prone, and risky task of interpreting a woman’s sexual
intentions. This is made worse by the earlier reviewed tendency for sexual
consent communications to take place via hints, innuendo, tentative attempts,
and nonverbal and/or indirect communications.
c. The problem o f misleading cultural scripts. Adding to the preceding
problems of interpretation, substantial evidence suggests that some
disturbing widespread cultural beliefs further promote misunderstanding.
Specifically, such beliefs tend to inappropriately inflate perceptions of
women’s sexual intentions. Researchers have identified sexual scripts that
exist to define expectations for how sexual encounters are to take place: who
is to initiate sex and how, the conditions under which sex is to take place, the
roles each gender is to play in both the initiation and conduct of sex, what
indicates willingness versus resistance, and much more.44
Perhaps the most serious among these is belief in “token resistance” to
sex, or the belief that women often say no at first, even when they actually
do want to have sex.45 Males believe in this notion, and a third to half of

43 See Davis, supra note 31.
44 See Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why,
in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158(3) U. P a . L. Rev . 729, 793-98 (2010); N. Tatiana Masters
et al., Sexual Scripts Among Young Heterosexually Active Men and Women: Continuity and
Change, 50 J. S ex Res . 409, 413 (2013); see also Stacey J. Hust et al., Establishing and
Adhering to Sexual Consent: The Association Between Reading Magazines and College
Students’ Sexual Consent Negotiation, 51 J. Sex Res. 280 (2014) (explaining the effects of
magazine exposure on college students’ sexual intentions regarding consent).
45 See Charlene L. Muehlenhard, Examining Stereotypes About Token Resistance to Sex,
35 P sychol. Women Q. 676 (2011); Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do
Women Sometimes Say No When They Mean Yes? The Prevalance and Correlates o f Women’s
Token Resistance To Sex, 54 J. P ersonality & Soc. P sychol. 872 (1988); Susan Sprecher et
al., Token Resistance to Sexual Intercourse and Consent to Unwanted Sexual Intercourse:
College Students’Dating Experiences in Three Countries, 31 J. Sex R es. 125 (1994).
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females report engaging in such token resistance.46 This is done largely for
impression management (in order not to appear promiscuous).47 The problem
is that this introduces genuine ambiguity, even in interpretation of very
explicit refusals, particularly when other behaviors consistent with consent
are present. Moreover, it introduces this actual ambiguity for a behavior
many men already believe is likely to indicate consent. This situation can
contribute both to rape and to vindication of the rapist. Jurors are significantly
affected by such cultural scripts as well, which can carry more weight than
legal definitions and instructions.48
d. The effects o f context. Though we are unaware of research testing this
proposition, it is highly plausible that interpretation of sexual intentions is
heavily influenced by the context in which the man and woman meet and
interact. For example, in sexualized contexts such as fraternity parties or bars,
where hookups are common and expected, the same behaviors that might be
recognized as irrelevant to sexual interest in other contexts (such as work)
can be interpreted in more sexual terms.
e. The filter o f personal desires. Adding to such context effects, the
individuals who tend to populate sexualized contexts tend to be more
receptive to sexual hookups. Individuals of both genders who are more
receptive to short-term and casual sexual relationships are more prone to
interpret behaviors as reflecting sexual interest49; and people are generally
prone to project their own desires for sex onto those they are interacting
with.50 Generally, sexual motivation can lead to overperception of sexual
interest in the target of one’s desires.

46 Muehlenhard, supra note 45, at 679-80 (discussing men and women’s use of and beliefs
about the token resistance phenomenon); Muehlenhard & Hollabaugh, supra note 45, at 874
(finding that almost 40% of women studied said “no” when they meant “yes,” approximately
85% said “no” when they meant “no,” over 68% said “no” when they meant “maybe,” and
among sexually experienced women, over 60% engaged in token resistance); Sprecher et ah,
supra note 45, at 129-31 (discussing token resistance and consent to unwanted sex across
American, Russian, and Japanese cultures, and finding that men as well as women engage in
the phenomenon).
47 E.g., Muehlenhard & Hollabaugh, supra note 45, at 875.
48 See Kahan, supra note 44, at 788.
49 Emma C. Howell, et ah, The Sexual Overperception Bias Is Associated with
Sociosexuality, 53 P ersonality & Individual Difference 1012,1014-15 (2012).
50 David Dryden Henningsen & Mary Lynn Miller Henningsen, Testing Error
Management Theory: Exploring the Commitment Skepticism Bias and the Sexual
Overperception Bias, 36 H um . Comm . Res . 618, 628 (2010).
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2. Interpreting Intoxication
In addition to problems with interpretation of sexual intentions,
witnesses may have problems with interpretation of another’s level of
intoxication. As discussed earlier, observers may be asked to report on
specific behaviors reflecting ingestion and/or intoxication. But they may also
be asked for general impressions of the degree of either party’s intoxication.
This poses several challenges of interpretation. What is the relationship
between amount consumed and intoxication or incapacitation for the specific
person? Can he or she drink a lot and still function, or is (s)he a relatively
“cheap drunk?” What is the relationship between intoxication and behavior
for that person? Is (s)he normally extremely outgoing, aggressive or
flirtatious, or is this a reflection of intoxication? Reporting subjective
inteipretations of intoxication without the needed personal context
infonnation can be significantly misleading, though other indicators, such as
throwing up, slurring speech and others might be more objective.
3. The Haze o f Alcohol: Intoxication and Interpretation
Whether interpreting sexual intentions or intoxication, an intoxicated
person can be more subject to error. To understand how intoxication might
compromise interpretation of what is observed, one must consider what is
necessary for correct interpretation.
a. Attention and interpretation. Particularly when considering another’s
behavior (even the simplest statements), a great deal of contextual
information is relevant. For example, the simple statement, “Whew, it sure is
hot in here” might be interpreted as an actual comment on room temperature,
as an indirect request to open a window, as a reflection of a menopausal hot
flash, or as a comment on the sexiness of someone who just entered the room,
among other possibilities.51 Awareness of the immediate social context, the
historical social context of those present, personal characteristics of the
speaker and hearer and other contextual information can help to disambiguate
the meaning successfully. Intoxication affects the complexity with which an
event is processed, and the extent to which available relevant information is
brought to bear on interpretation of what is perceived.
Claude Steele coined the term “alcohol myopia” to refer to the tendency
of alcohol use to narrow the focus of attention to salient immediate stimuli,

51 Deborah Davis & Richard D. Friedman, Memory for Conversation: The Orphan Child
o f Witness Memory Researchers, in 1 T he Handbook of Eyewitness M emory : Memory for
E vents 3, 22 (Michael P. Toglia et al., eds); see also Davis & Villalobos, supra note 20 at
439-40.
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at the expense of other contextual information.52 Intoxicated persons are less
able to attend to multiple cues, relate incoming information to existing
knowledge, draw abstract inferences, or process new semantic information.53
The more remote the contextual cues, either in the immediate context or in
memory, the less likely they are to be considered in any context, particularly
when the person is intoxicated. That is, the narrowed focus of attention
restricts the extent to which contextual information will be noticed.54 Adding
to this, intoxication-related impairments in executive functions and working
memory make it more difficult and less likely for relevant contextual
information to be retrieved from long-term memory.55 The result, as Nobel
prize-winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman put it, is judgment based on
the assumption “WYSIATI” (What you see is all there is!).56 Judgments are
based only on what is most strongly drawing the perceiver’s attention,
without consideration of the remaining relevant information.
During a sexual encounter this may result, for example, in the perceiver
focusing only on another’s behavior without consideration of contextual
cues, such as the level of the person’s intoxication, the relationship history
between them relevant to current intentions, historical information about the
person’s sexual behavior and preferences while not intoxicated, the impact
of his or her own behavior on the other person’s, and other relevant
information. Or, a witness may observe the accuser walking shakily and
exclaiming, “Oh my God, I can’t walk straight!” (and infer—and later
“remember”—that she was drunk), but fail to notice the contextual
information that she was trying on her friend’s seven inch heels.
We have argued that the previously noted pervasive involvement of

52 Steele & Josephs, supra note 18, at 923.
53 Id.
54 See, e.g., Alistair Harvey et al., The Effects o f Alcohol Intoxication on Attention and
Memory for Visual Scenes, 21 M emory 969, 979 (2013); Nadja Schreiber Compo et al.,

Alcohol Intoxication and Memory for Events: A Snapshot o f Alcohol Myopia in a Real-World
Drinking Scenario, 19 M emory 202, 208 (2011).
55 Thomas O. Nelson et al., Effects o f Alcohol Intoxication on Metamemory and on
Retrieval from Long-Term Memory, 115 J. Experimental PSYCHOL. G en. 247, 252 (1986);
S.A. Magrys & M.C. Olmstead, Alcohol Intoxication Alters Cognitive Skills Mediated by
Frontal and Temporal Brain Regions, 85 B rain & COGNITION 271, 274 (2014); Catharine
Montgomery et al., The Effects o f a Modest Dose o f Alcohol on Executive Functioning and
Prospective Memory, 26 H um . P sychopharmacology C linical & Experimental 208,212—
13 (2011); Michael A. Sayette et al., Parental Alcoholism and the Effects o f Alcohol on
Mediated Semantic Priming, 9 Experimental & C linical P sychopharmacology 409,41213 (2001).
56 D aniel K ahneman, T hinking, F ast and S low 79,85-88,201,209-11 (lste d . 2011).
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intoxication in claims of nonconsensual sex57 is due in part to fact that
intoxication can impair perception of sexual-consent relevant messages. This
has been tested primarily for intoxicated men, who have been shown to be
slower to recognize cues of nonconsent and to interpret messages of non
consent less accurately. Unfortunately, intoxicated women tend to convey
less clear signs of refusal, and tend to do so at a later time in the interaction,
thereby adding to the already present tendency for intoxicated men to
misperceive.58
b. Expectancies and interpretation. A second way in which
interpretation may be affected by intoxication concerns expectancies. In
general, we tend to interpret what we see in line with what we expect59 as
well as with what we desire.60 Alcohol enhances these tendencies such that
the interpretations of intoxicated individuals are more affected by
expectancies.61 This happens in part because executive functions are
impaired by alcohol.62 When executive functions are impaired the person is
less likely to, in effect, second-guess the accuracy of gut-reactions and
expectations activated in the situation. Automatic first impressions based on
these expectations will go uncorrected by more conscious controlled
consideration of other information that is relevant to their accuracy. The
result is that judgments are more driven by expectations of all sorts: including
those based on the nature of the situation, beliefs about the persons involved,
social stereotypes, alcohol expectancies, and others.
Thus, alcohol use can exacerbate the influence of expectations on
interpretation. Moreover, a number of expectancies specific to intoxication

57 See sources cited supra note 6.
58 Davis & Villalobos, supra note 20, at 444; Villalobos et a l, supra note 20; Deborah
Davis & Elizabeth F. Loftus, What s Good fo r the Goose Cooks the Gander: Inconsistencies
Between the Law and Psychology o f Voluntary Intoxication and Sexual Assault, in HANDBOOK
of F orensic P sychology: Resource for M ental H ealth and Legal P rofessionals 997,
1009, 1018-19 (William T. O’Donohue & Eric R. Levensky eds., 2004).
59 See generally M ichael Shermer, T he Believing Brain : F rom Ghosts and Gods to
P olitics and Conspiracies— How W e C onstruct B eliefs and R einforce T hem as T ruth
259-61(2011) (describing the psychological tendency to attend to information that confirms
previously held beliefs and expectations over contradictory information).
60 See generally David Dunning, Motivated Cognition in S elf and Social Thought, in T he
APA H andbook of P ersonality and Social P sychology 111 (Mario Mikulincer et al. eds.,
2014) (discussing epistemic pressures, affirmational pressures, and social-relational pressures,
which lead people’s to perceive “preferred conclusions”).
61 See, e.g., William H. George & Susan A. Stoner, Understanding Acute Alcohol Effects
on Sexual Behavior, 11 Ann . R ev. S ex R es. 92, 116 (2000).
62 See Magrys & Olmstead, supra note 55.
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have been documented, some particularly relevant to sexual interactions.63
For example, alcohol facilitates sexual arousal (and interest in and enjoyment
of sex), and many report using alcohol to facilitate these responses.64 Men
and women perceive others of both genders as more sexually aroused, easier
to seduce and more willing to consent, and mutual alcohol consumption is
viewed as a sign of sexual intent and/or consent.65 Moreover, voluntary
sexual activity is more likely among the intoxicated, and women are more
likely to consume alcohol when willing than when not willing to have sex.66
Perhaps for such reasons, alcohol is commonly used as a tool of seduction by
both sexes, and the claims of rape for intoxicated accusers are perceived as
less credible.67
Such findings make clear that significant expectancies exist to associate
intoxication with voluntary sexual activity. Though these expectancies are
likely to lead unintoxicated perceivers to attribute greater sexual intent to an
intoxicated target, they are likely to exert even greater influence for
intoxicated perceivers.
4. The Role o f Emotion
A final problem of encoding concerns the potentially high level of
emotions involved in sexual situations generally, and in those involving
distress and/or coercion specifically. Because strong emotions also impair
executive functions, they can exert effects on encoding that are similar in
many respects to those of alcohol—that is, those experiencing strong
emotions tend to focus attention more narrowly (on emotion-relevant
stimuli).68 The more deliberative and corrective cognitive processes that
would otherwise reduce the effects of expectancies on processing and
interpretation are also less likely to occur when emotions are high.69 The

63 For reviews, see Davis & Loftus, supra note 58, at 1000-15; Amee B. Patel & Kim
Fromme, Explicit Outcome Expectancies and Substance Use: Current Research and Future
Directions, in H andbook of D rug U se Etiology 147-64 (Lawrence M. Scheier ed., 2010);
Abbey, supra note 6, at 482-83.
64 Davis & Loftus, supra note 58, at 1000-09.

6SId.
66 See also Davis et al., supra note 31, at 125.
67 See Davis & Loftus, supra note 58, at 1004—05, 1007, 1017-18.
68 See, e.g., Linda J. Levine & Robin S. Edelstein, Emotion and Memory Narrowing: A
Review and Goal-Relevance Approach, 23 COGNITION & EMOTION 833, 833-34 (2009).
69 See Deborah Davis & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Expectancies, Emotion and Memory Reports
o f Visual Events, in The V isual World in M emory 178, 190-95 (J.R. Brockmole ed., 2009);
Levine & Edelstein, supra note 68, at 842^13; Tomoe Nobata et al., The Functional Field of
View Becomes Narrower While Viewing Negative Emotional Stimuli, 24 C ognition &
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specific nature of the emotions matter as well. Incoming information tends
to be interpreted as consistent with those emotions.70 An angry person, for
example, is more likely to interpret others’ behaviors as more hostile. At
extreme levels, emotion can cause a catastrophic decline in cognitive
functions and impair the ability to encode successfully at all.71
Not surprisingly, the effects of negative emotions and stress on
eyewitness memory have been extensively studied,72 as many criminal events
produce such emotions for the victims and witnesses. A recent meta-analysis
of such studies showed that witness stress was associated with poorer
performance in identification of the perpetrator, including fewer correct
identifications and more false identifications.73 Moreover, stress was
associated with poorer memory for other details74
These errors speak to the more general effects of emotion on the
likelihood and quality of encoding. However, there is evidence that emotion
affects the interpretation of stimuli and events as well, as illustrated by
research on effects of affective priming.75 For example, those experiencing
anxiety tend to interpret others’ emotional states more negatively,76 and the
same phenomenon occurs with depressed individuals.77 Emotions tend to
activate emotion-relevant schemas, behavioral scripts, and emotionconsistent information in memory, which then serve as context for
interpretation of incoming information. In this way, both an accuser
experiencing negative emotions during the encounter as well as the accused
(who may have experienced very positive emotions at the time) can both be
subject to distortion in interpretation of their own and others’ behaviors and
of other contextual information during the event in question.

E motion 88 6 ,890-91 (2010).

Joseph P. Forgas & Alex S. Koch, Mood Effects on Cognition, in Handbook of
C ognition and Emotion 231, 235-36 (Michael D. Robinson et al. eds., 2013).
71 John Fazey & Lew Hardy, T he Inverted-U Hypothesis: A Catastrophe for Sport
P sychology? 10 (1988).
72 Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on
Eyewitness Memory, 28 L. & Hum . Behav. 687, 688-89 (2004).
73 Id. at 694-98.
74 Id. at 699-704.
75 See, e.g., Joseph P. Forgas, Affect and Cognition., 3 P ersps. on P sychol. Sci. 94, 98
(2008).
76 Ai Koizumi et al., The Effects o f Anxiety on the Interpretation o f Emotion in the FaceVoice Pairs, 213 E xperimental Brain Res . 275,275 (2011).
77 Jonas Everaert et al., Attention, Interpretation, and Memory Biases in Subclinical
Depression: A Proof-of-Principle Test of the Combined Cognitive Biases Hypothesis, 14
E motion 331, 336 (2014).
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II. m e m o r y F a il u r e s D u r in g S t o r a g e a n d R e t r ie v a l : F a d in g ,
D is t o r t io n , S u g g e s t io n a n d R e c o n s t r u c t io n

Regardless of what the person encodes about an event, this information
does not stay stable in memory over time. Instead, it becomes subject to loss,
fading, or change. Much of what is encoded is lost immediately,78 and
progressively more is lost over time. What remains tends to become less clear
(fading), to become primarily semantic rather than sensory, and to change,
largely in predictable ways.79 These realities of memory failures, while often
presenting only minor challenges for everyday life, can present serious issues
in the context of litigation.
In the following sections we first review the contrast between the
demands of the legal system for detail versus the limits of memory
performance. We then consider the nature of memory, and the primacy of
memory for the “gist” or essence of the event over memory for detail. We
then review evidence of the vulnerability of gist memory to distortion, and
specific sources of such distortion. These include intoxication, hindsight,
personal motivations, internal and external suggestion, and problems of
“source monitoring” (incorrect understanding of where “memories” come
from).
A. DEMANDS FOR ACCURATE DETAIL VERSUS REALITIES OF MEMORY
PERFORMANCE

As we noted, the need for extensive details of sexual consent
interactions stands in stark contrast to how memory works and to the actual
capabilities of the parties and witnesses to provide such details accurately.80
Memory for such a level of detail would not be fully accurate under any
circumstances. But, as we noted, what is not attended to at the time it occurs
is unlikely to be remembered later. And, what is not considered important at
the time is less likely to be attended to, such as exactly what was ingested
when. Many aspects of an event—whether overt behaviors or subjective
thoughts and intentions—become important in hindsight, sometimes due to
their relevance to legal issues, but would not seem equally important at the
time they occurred, and therefore would not necessarily be attended to or
encoded specifically into memory. If not encoded adequately at the time of
78 Hermann E bbinghaus, M emory: A C ontribution to E xperimental P sychology
76-80 (Henry A. Ruger & Clara E. Bussenius trans. 1913) (1885).
79 C harles J. B rainerd & V alerie F. Reyna, T he Science of F alse M emory 4, 59-96
(2005) (describing science of false memory).

80 Deborah Davis & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Inconsistencies Between Law and the Limits o f
Human Cognition: The Case o f Eyewitness Identification 29, 29-58, in M emory and L aw
(Lynn Nadel & Walter P. Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 2012).
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the event they cannot be recalled accurately, if at all.
But in addition to the need for a large number of details, memory for the
exact details is typically crucial. That is, the exact manner in which consent
or lack of consent was conveyed can be crucial for deciding whether a
reasonable person would understand it as such. Unfortunately, memory does
not reliably preserve such exact details. Instead, memories can fade, become
less clear, and sometimes be distorted. If the event is not completely
forgotten, the sensory images and details fade relatively quickly, and the
remaining memory tends to be for the gist of what happened, rather than for
exact detail. This is most especially true for conversation or verbal
statements, though it is also true for other nonverbal communications
surrounding sexual encounters.81
Memories will also not stay stable over time. They may change, such
that the person can remember things differently than they originally
happened, or may remember things that never happened at all.82 Each of these
processes poses challenges for the accuracy of witness memory.
B. GIST REPRESENTATIONS CAN BE MISLEADING
The fact that we tend to remember the gist of experiences rather than
the fine detail, has implications for the accuracy of memory. To appreciate
this, keep in mind that memory is not simply a replay of sensory images of
the event akin to a video, audio, or sensory tape replay. Instead, it consists of
two general components. The first, called “verbatim” images, are much like
such a sensory replay.83 The second, “gist” memories, refers to the person’s
sense of the basics of what happened, and includes interpretation of the
sensory images—for example, interpreted meaning (e.g., insult) versus the
exact statement (e.g., “You really like to eat, don’t you!”).84
Put another way, gist represents the basic story the person tells him or
herself about what was experienced, or the beliefs the person has about what
happened. Gist memory is primarily semantic, and contains much less detail
than the original event or the original sensory experiences of the event.
Verbatim images fade more quickly than gist memories, leaving memory
over time to consist primarily of gist, accompanied by less and less sensory
detail as time goes on.
Each party is most likely to encode and remember gist interpretations of
specific behaviors and the interaction as a whole, and evaluative/emotional
81
82
83
84

Davis & Friedman, supra note 51, at 11-12, 16-18, 21, 41.
Brainerd & Reyna, supra note 79, at 274-79.
Davis & Loftus, supra note 69, at 197.

Id.
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reactions to their own and others’ statements and behaviors. As a result, when
asked about very specific content of another’s statements or behaviors, a
party or witness may be unable to answer with the needed degree of
specificity. Instead, reports of what was done to ask for or convey consent or
nonconsent will often be conveyed in general gist-based terms.
Often, such reports will convey an outcome (e.g., “I made it clear I
didn’t want this!” or “She made it very clear that she wanted it!”) rather than
what, specifically, was done to convey the message (e.g., “I pushed him
away, and told him, “No, I don’t want to.” or “She took her clothes off and
got into bed.”). The problem arises when the specific actual communications
were much less clear to the recipient than the outcome-based reports would
suggest. In such circumstances, witness reports can give the impression that
the speaker’s desires were more clearly and definitively conveyed than they
were.
That is, each person may or may not be remembering specific behaviors
at all. For example, gist memories include emotional reactions to the event.
Consider what may happen for sexual encounters that were voluntary at the
time, but unwanted and perhaps unpleasant (that is, the woman did agree to
have sex even if she would rather not have). If the accuser feels aversion to
the sexual encounter at the time it occurs and later remembers primarily the
emotion that she didn’t like it, she may report that she clearly conveyed her
unwillingness to the accused. But her report may be based on varying levels
of specificity in memory for exactly how this was conveyed. She may assume
her distaste was obvious: that her feelings would have shown overtly and be
easily read by the accused. She may remember the gist of nonverbal cues she
believes she displayed, but over-interpret their clarity to others. Or, she may
remember clearly exactly what was said and done, such that the verbatim
images correspond in meaning to the gist representations of the event.
For various reasons, however, verbatim memories for disputed sexual
encounters may be less likely to be retained and reported than gist-based
accounts. This is true for memories in general, as we previously noted. But
several characteristics of sexual consent interactions, particularly those
involving intoxicated parties, render this more likely. Prominently, these
include the extended time frame across which sexual intentions are
developed, conveyed and interpreted; the ongoing updating of interpretation
for sexual intentions in which what is most clearly remembered is the current
assessment; the well-documented tendency for conversations to be
interpreted and remembered in terms of their gist meaning; and the effects of
alcohol on the range and depth of encoding.
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C. GIST MEMORIES AND MEMORY DISTORTION

One prominent theory of memory, “fuzzy trace theory,” suggests that
when verbatim images are weak (i.e., the person has less ability to, in effect,
replay a tape of the event) and gist memories are strong, the person is most
susceptible to memory distortion and to development of specific types of
false memories.85
With gist memory the person has the idea that a particular event
happened but does not possess strong verbatim images to support exactly
how it happened, and therefore cannot fully replay the event in memory. Gist
memories themselves may also be more or less detailed. Thus, the person
may tell himself, “I spent the night with Mary and I don’t really like Mary.”
Generally, people like to make sense of experiences. This requires
resolving them with existing knowledge and other experiences. Obvious
inconsistencies are experienced as aversive and produce a need to resolve the
inconsistency in a way that explains it satisfactorily (e.g., “I had to stay with
Jerry because I was too drunk to drive home.” or “I tried to go home, but he
forced me to stay.”). Often, this can happen explicitly and consciously as the
person reasons with him or herself to resolve the inconsistencies, as
illustrated by the bodies of research on “cognitive dissonance”86 and
“motivated cognition.”87 Often, however, it occurs unconsciously, so that the
person finds themselves thinking of the event differently without awareness
of how the account had changed or been supplemented by new information
that would make more sense of the experience.88
Restructuring of our experiences in memory is not limited to such
motivational processes. In thinking of the gist of experiences, other
knowledge becomes relevant to understand and interpret the experience. If,
for example, a woman thinks of an event as “I was raped,” other knowledge
of what is meant by rape, the ways rape can happen, what the alleged rapist
is like, and much more becomes relevant to the event. When the person thinks
of the event, this knowledge tends to get activated in memory (which works

See C.J. Brainerd & V.F. Reyna, Fuzzy Trace Theory and False Memory, 11 CURRENT
Directions P sychol. Sci. 164,166 (2002); B rainerd & Reyna, supra note 79, at 82-89.
86 See generally J oel C ooper, C ognitive D issonance: 50 Years of a C lassic T heory
2-3 (2007) (defining and explaining the theory o f cognitive dissonance).
87 See generally David Dunning, Motivated Cognition in S elf and Social Thought 111,
777-96, in The APA H andbook of P ersonality and Social P sychology (Mario

Mikulincer et al. eds., 2014) (same, with motivated cognition).
88 Ezequiel Morsella et al., Cognitive Conflict and Consciousness, in Cognitive
C onsistency: A F undamental P rinciple in Social C ognition 19—46. (Bertram Gawronski
& Fritz Strack, eds. 2012).
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by association), and can become confused with things that actually
happened.89 For instance, if thoughts of protesting overtly are activated in
memory as central to the idea of “rape,” the person may incorrectly think she
had overtly protested during the event.
These are the types of false memories predicted by fuzzy trace theory
when verbatim images are vague or unclear and gist memories are strong.
That is, the person’s broad knowledge and expectations of the type of event,
or the people involved (including him or herself), or the emotions the person
experiences, are activated when the gist memory is retrieved. If the verbatim
images are not sufficiently strong to contradict this information, the activated
information may be incorporated into the gist representation. In this way,
false memories may form that are generally consistent with the gist of the
event as the person remembers it, and with the many features, emotions, and
expectations associated with it.90
This may be particularly true for the accuser, who is likely to have
experienced disputed sexual encounters more negatively. For example, some
researchers have provided evidence that negative emotion increases
vulnerability to memory distortion.91 Brainerd and colleagues, for example,
argued that negative events are more likely to be encoded as “gists.”92
Consistent with fuzzy trace theory, this would increase the likelihood of
filling in blanks and reconstructing memories to become more consistent
with this gist representation.93 Others have provided evidence that positive
emotions can also increase susceptibility to distortion (though in perhaps
lesser degree), as might be true for the accused who pursued and enjoyed the
disputed encounter.94

89 Brainerd & Reyna, supra note 85, at 166.
90 Id.
91 Thomas M. Hess et al., Mood, Motivation, and Misinformation: Aging and Affective
State Influences on Memory, 19 A ging, N europsychology. & Cognition 13, 16 (2012);
Stephen Porter et al., Blinded by Emotion? Effect o f Emotionality o f a Scene on Susceptibility
to False Memories, 35 C an. J. B ehav. Sci. 165, 172 (2003); Stephen Porter et al., A
Prospective Investigation o f the Vulnerability o f Memory fo r Positive and Negative Emotional
Scenes to the Misinformation Effect, 42 Can . J. Behav. SCI. 55, 59 (2010).
92 C.J. Brainerd et al., Developmental Reversals in False Memory: Effects o f Emotional
Valence and Arousal, 107 J. E xperimental C hild P sychol. 137,150(2010).
93 Id. at 165.
94 See Stephen Porter et al., Prime Time News: The Influence o f Primed Positive and
Negative Emotion on Susceptibility to False Memories, 28 Cognition & E motion 1422,
1431-32 (2014); Linda Levine & Susan Bluck, Painting with Broad Strokes: Happiness and
the Malleability o f Event Memory, 18 C ognition & Emotion 559, 570-72 (2004).
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D. GIST MEMORY AND DISTORTION IN THE CONTEXT OF
INTOXICATION
As fuzzy trace theory suggests, the very conditions of encoding made
more likely by intoxication are those that promote memory distortion over
time.93 When intoxicated, people form less clear verbatim memories. A
person may remember the gist of what happened and have very strong
emotions associated with it but lack very clear memory for detail. These are
the very circumstances described above that promote false, but gistconsistent memories based on the person’s emotional reactions and
expectations of what was likely to have happened in such an event.
Consistent with the large body of research demonstrating such drifts of
both autobiographical and general event memory toward consistency with
other known or believed information,96 we have argued that when a person is
asked to remember the way they personally behaved while intoxicated, there
is a tendency to answer in part based on how the person thinks he or she
would behave in those circumstances, particularly when the memories of the
event are vague or unclear.97 Because people often behave very differently
while intoxicated than they do when sober, inferences rooted in their selfconcept and memories of their own past behavior about how they would
behave while intoxicated can be quite wrong.98 This would be more likely,
of course, for a person without much history of severe intoxication, or much
history in the kind of situation in question, as a basis for accurate expectations
of their own behavior in that situation while intoxicated.
The issue of inference-based accounts can be particularly problematic
when an interviewer wants very specific answers and the witness has only
“gist” memories.99 The pressures on witnesses to answer with detailed,
precise information can be very strong and repetitive, and witnesses
generally try to answer the questions asked of them. If the actual memory is
a gist-based account he or she may well answer based on fuzzy thoughts
about how (s)he would have behaved (based in part on vague memories of

95 Brainerd & Reyna, supra note 85, at 165.
96 Harry P. Bahrick, Loss and Distortion o f Autobiographical Memory Content, in
A utobiographical M emory: T heoretical and A pplied P erspectives 69, 72, (Charles P.
Thompson et al., eds., 2014); see generally Robert A. Nash et al., On the Persuadability o f
Memory: Is Changing People’s Memories No More than Changing Their Minds?, 106 B rit.
J. Psychol. 308 (2014) (identifying confluence of research on belief and persuasion with
research on memory and advocating further study).
97 Davis & Loftus, supra note 58, at 1019-20.
98 Id.
99 See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
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what happened combined with guesses or assumptions about how it would
have happened).
A large body of research has documented the way in which memory can
be reconstructed to fit current knowledge. For example, in a classic
demonstration of hindsight-based reconstruction of memory for
conversation, Ulric Neisser compared John Dean’s testimony during the
Watergate hearings to the actual tapes of his conversations with President
Nixon.100John Dean found out after the original conversations took place that
the Watergate cover-up was discovered, and that it cost Nixon his
presidency.101 And, Dean testified at the Watergate hearings that he had
warned the president in advance that the deception would be discovered, and
that he would lose the presidency because of it.102 But the tapes of his
conversations with Nixon revealed that he had never given such warnings!103
Although it is possible that Dean knowingly made this false claim, Neisser
suggested, and hindsight research would as well, that Dean simply
misremembered.104 Given the outcome, it made sense to him that he would
have foreseen it. And if he foresaw it, it made sense that he would have
warned the president.105 His memory of the past was likely reconstructed in
light of his present knowledge of the outcome.106
A laboratory study by Linda Carli illustrated such hindsight effects in a
rape-relevant context.107 All participants read a scenario of an interaction
between a man and a woman, and afterward learned of one of two endings to
the encounter.108 Half were told that the man ended up raping the woman,
whereas the other half were told he ended up proposing marriage.109 Later,
their memories of the encounter were tested.110 Each group developed some
false memories for what happened: Those told the woman was raped
remembered more false details consistent with the outcome of rape; whereas
those told the man proposed remembered more false details consistent with

100 Ulric Neisser, John Dean's Memory: A Case Study, 9 C ognition 1, 4-19 (1981).
101 Id. at 9-10.
102 See id. at 9.
103 See id. at 7-8.
104 Id. at 9-10.
105 Id. at 10.
106 Id.
107 See Linda L. Carli, Cognitive Reconstruction, Hindsight, and Reactions to Victims and
Perpetrators, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC’Y PSYCHOL. B ull . 966, 966-78 (1999).
108 Id at 971.
109 Id
m Id.
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romance and the proposal.1" Each group remembered fewer false details that
were inconsistent with the outcome they had learned of.112 As with John
Dean, memories were reconstructed in hindsight to be consistent with their
updated knowledge: to make sense in light of what they now knew to be true.
Such results provide a cautionary tale for interpretation of witness
accounts of observations of the accused and accuser. Once an allegation of
rape is made known, such witnesses are in a position similar to that of
participants in Carli’s study. They saw what they saw. But now they are
remembering it in the context of new information that can restructure their
understanding and memory of what they saw. The nature of that restructuring
may well depend upon the new “gist” label they give to the story. Will that
label be “rape?” Or will it be “false allegation?” Each has different
implications for what restructuring would be “gist-consistent.”
Similar processes would occur with memory for intoxication. To the
extent witnesses have stronger gist memories of the alleged victim’s level of
intoxication than verbatim memories, susceptibility to memory distortion
will be increased."3
The direction of memory distortion will be affected by the witness’s
general attitudes and beliefs, specific attitudes and beliefs concerning the
parties and events in question, and personal preferences and motivations.
That is, for those inclined to view the incident as rape (such as the victim or
sympathetic witnesses), memory for indicators of intoxication is likely to
become distorted to reflect greater apparent intoxication, whereas the reverse
is likely to be true for the accused and those sympathetic to him.
Also, as suggested by the research on hindsight and memory reviewed
earlier,114 judgments and memories may become distorted to align with the
likelihood of rape, simply because witnesses learn of the accusation. The
chances of such distortion would be enhanced if witnesses are exposed to
other “evidence” in support of the accusation of rape.
E. THE PROBLEM OF MOTIVATED MEMORY DISTORTION
Once the potential interpretation of rape is raised, a number of
motivations arise in both accuser and accused. Both may be intensely
concerned with understanding the encounter: what happened exactly, why

111 See id.
112 Id.
113 See Brainerd & Reyna, supra note 85, at 165-67; B rainerd & R eyna, supra note 79,
at 100-06.
114 E.g., Carli, supra note 107.
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each behaved how they did, and why each is interpreting things differently.
Each is also likely to be concerned with defending their interpretation (to
themselves and others), and with the social and legal consequences for each
interpretation (false allegation versus rape versus honest misunderstanding,
etc.). Memory may also be distorted by the need for self-justification and
self-esteem maintenance.115
For instance, among the many emotions arising in cases of alleged
sexual assault is that of shame. To the extent that voluntary sexual activity
with the defendant would be regarded as shameful for whatever reason, the
witness may misremember the sexual encounter as nonconsensual to avert
such feelings and to protect self-esteem.
Shame may be provoked for a variety of reasons. The accuser may feel
that sexual behavior under the circumstances of the event in question may be
inappropriate. She might feel that sex had occurred too soon in the
relationship. It might have involved infidelity on either person’s part (as it
did for Helen). Sex with the specific accused person might be embarrassing:
because he is unattractive, or otherwise undesirable. Such feelings of shame
can be intensified by comments from friends or police interviewers.
Whatever their source, feelings of shame can motivate both accused and
accuser to view the event differently from the way it actually happened. With
a rape interpretation, the accuser need not feel so much shame as she would
for having committed the actions voluntarily. With a consensual
interpretation, the accused need not feel as much shame as if he or others
were to see him as a rapist.
In some cases the reverse might be true. That is, the victim may feel
shame (or be shamed by others) as the result of behaviors she or others may
feel contributed to the rape: such as going somewhere alone with the rapist,
drinking with him, affectionate behaviors, and others. Such feelings can
contribute to self-blame, fears of social reactions, and failures to report rape
when it does occur.116
Changes in feelings toward the other party can provide additional
context and motivations with potential to, in hindsight, alter interpretations
of behavior. This can happen in response to divorce, breakups, unanticipated
post-event behaviors (such as when the man does not call, or the woman has
had sex with someone else). Because our original interpretation of events, as
115 C arol T avris & E lliot Aronson, M istakes W ere M ade (But N ot by M e): W hy
W e Justify F oolish B eliefs, B ad Decisions, and H urtful Acts 78-82 (2007).
116 C olleen A. W ard, A ttitudes T oward R ape : F eminist and Social P sychological
P erspectives 124-28 (1995); R obin W arshaw, I N ever C alled It R ape: T he M s . R eport
on Recognizing, F ighting, and Surviving D ate and A cquaintance R ape 56-79 (1988).
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well as later memory for those events, tends to be distorted toward
consistency with other relevant beliefs, negative feelings or beliefs about the
other can produce negative interpretations and memories. If one develops a
negative impression of the person after the fact, their actions tend to be
reinterpreted in hindsight in more negative terms than they were experienced
at the tim e."7 Thus, while motivations such as hatred, jealousy, revenge, hurt
feelings, and so on may lead to deliberate false reports, the same motivations
can also lead to honest errors of memory.
It is interesting to note that even the process of repeatedly thinking about
the event by oneself, or in the context of a nonsuggestive interview or
conversation, can promote the development of false gist-consistent
memories. Because the person is led to retrieve the gist memory, the
additional gist-relevant knowledge, expectations, and emotions can be
activated with each retrieval, posing successively more opportunity to
confuse the original and self-activated relevant material, and to add to or
distort memory.118 But additional bias is introduced by motivations
surrounding the interpersonal conflict, public accusations, and social and
legal consequences.
It is also important to note that things that have been actively thought
about or imagined can later be falsely remembered as having actually
happened—in a process known as “imagination inflation.”119 Such false
memories can develop for the very mundane (such as falsely remembering
saying something one only intended to say) to the seemingly impossible
(such as falsely remembering being the victim of satanic ritual abuse
spanning multiple years).120 Laboratory studies have shown that memories
for events that never happened (such as being bitten by animals, rides in hot
air balloons, witnessing demon possession and many others) can be planted
in participants through procedures involving suggestion and active
117 For evidence that current emotions can distort memory for the past, see Linda J. Levine
et al., Remembering Past Emotions: The Role o f Current Appraisals, 15 COGNITION &
EMOTION 393,411-14 (2001); Martin A. Safer et al., Distortion in Memoryfo r Emotions: The
Contributions o f Personality and Post-event Knowledge, 28 P ersonality & Soc. P sychol.
Bull. 1495,1504 (2002).
118 Brainerd & Reyna, supra note 85, at 164-69; B rainerd & R eyna, supra note 79, at
415-19.
119 Maryanne Garry, et al., Imagination Inflation: Imagining a Childhood Event Inflates
Confidence that It Occurred, 3 P sychonomic Bull. & Rev . 208, 209 (1996); see also
Brainerd & Reyna, supra note 79, at 415-19; D. Stephen Lindsay, Autobiographical
Memory, Eyewitness Reports, and Public Policy, 48 Can . P sychol. 57,59 (2007) (suggesting
that being asked to recall a memory may lead to false recollections).
120 Elizabeth F. Loftus & Deborah Davis, Recovered Memories, 2 Ann . R ev. C linical
P sychol. 469, 476 (2006); Lindsay, supra note 119, at 59.
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imagination and attempts to remember.121 More extreme false memories
typically develop through a combination of activities entailing actively
picturing and imagining the events, and suggestion from one or more
apparently credible sources that the events did occur.122
F. THE IMPACT OF SUGGESTION

In addition to self-generated distortions in memory, memories can be
affected by external suggestion. This can come from the many official
interviews triggered by a criminal allegation; conversations with other
witnesses, friends, or family; media accounts; reading books and articles on
sexual assault; and other sources.123 Suggestion may also occur in therapy
should an accuser seek it out, and a number of therapeutic practices are
sufficiently suggestive to alter memory or to create false memories for events
that never occurred124.
Suggestion from any source can take the form of direct suggestions
concerning the nature of the event, the persons involved, interpretations of
behaviors, etc. In one case for which the lead author (Davis) served as an
expert witness, the accuser and her long-time live-in boyfriend had engaged
in what she thought of as somewhat rough sex for years. But when she
described the details of their sexual activities to a new friend, the friend
immediately exclaimed, “But that’s rape, he’s been raping you for years!”
This led the accuser to redefine what happened, and ultimately to file charges.
Such labeling and redefinition may come from friends, therapists, police
or others, and can lead the witness to mentally review what happened in this
new light and come to remember it differently. The accuser may remember
more aggressive behaviors by the defendant and her own protests as more
forceful and clear than occurred at the time. The accused may remember the
accuser’s behaviors as more provocative when others label the accuser as a
liar.
Helen, from our example case, may have been influenced for somewhat
different yet similar reasons. She had engaged in a number of behaviors
viewed by both men and women (and jurors) as consistent with consent,125
such as drinking before and after they went to Jerry’s house, showing
affectionate behaviors toward Jerry, agreeing to spend the night, and so on.
Awareness of these behaviors may have stopped her from calling the sexual

121
122
123
124

Id. at 478-79.
Id.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 480-88.

125 Davis et al., supra note 31, at 101-40; W ard, supra note 116, at 101, 103.
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encounter rape, and stopped her from reporting it, until she talked with her
friend Chelsea two days later, who called it rape and who spent some time
encouraging Helen to report it. Chelsea had clearly judged that, on balance,
the encounter was not consensual despite Helen’s behaviors leading up to
intercourse. This could have led Helen to reinterpret in hindsight, or to
remember slightly differently, her own behaviors as more overtly and clearly
resistant to intercourse or as more clearly communicating that staying the
night and other behaviors did not mean consent.
It is worth noting that feedback from others concerning emotional
reactions to an event can affect subsequent emotions and memories. If this
feedback encourages distress, it can promote more negative memories of the
event and the emotions felt during it.126
1. Intoxication and Suggestibility
External suggestion might be especially powerful for those who were
intoxicated during the encounter, for whom memories are likely to be less
clear. Generally, studies of social influence and of memory conformity,
specifically, have shown that those who are less certain of a particular fact or
issue are more susceptible to influence from others.127 This is true for many
intoxicated accused and accusers, some of whom might possess virtually no
memories of what happened.
2. Interrogation, Memory Failures, and False Confession
A unique problem of memory can become relevant for the accused. If
the accusation is made to police, it is likely the accused will be interrogated
and a confession sought. Davis and Leo argued that those suspected of sexual
assault and other he-said, she-said kinds of allegations suffer enhanced
vulnerability to interrogation-induced confession, including false
confession.1215 Resistance to interrogation is fueled in part by awareness of
innocence (if innocent) and self-efficacy in defense against the allegations.

126 Melanie K. T. Takarangi & Deryn Strange, Emotional Impact Feedback Changes How
We Remember Negative Autobiographical Experiences, 57 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 354,
356-58 (2009).
I“7 Deborah Davis & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Internal and External Sources o f Distortion in
Adult Witness Memory 195,209-11, in 1 Handbook of E yewitness P sychology: M emory
for Events (Michael P. Toglia et al. eds., 2007).
128 Deborah Davis & Richard A. Leo, When Exoneration Seems Hopeless: The Special
Vulnerability o f Sexual Abuse Suspects to False Confession 5-6, passim (Univ. San Francisco
Law Res. Paper 2014-25), http://ssm.com/abstract=2481397 (forthcoming in Wrongful
A llegations of Sexual and C hild A buse (Ros Burnett, ed.) (Dec. 2016)).
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Interrogation tactics are intended to undermine this self-efficacy to convince
suspects that they are hopelessly caught, that the evidence overwhelmingly
implicates them, and that no one will believe their story. This makes it easier
for the remaining tactics to convince suspects that confession is in their best
interests.129
In part, self-efficacy is undermined by the nature of the evidentiary
situation characteristic of acquaintance rape allegations. That is, there is often
no evidence other than the accounts of each party. No evidence can be
imagined or found to prove the accused’s innocence, and he may feel the
accuser is likely to win the contest of credibility.130 However, an additional
level of vulnerability is posed by failures of memory. Interrogators will argue
that the suspect is guilty and promote the accuser’s version of the events in
question. If the suspect has no clear memories to dispute the specific
accusations, or to dispute the interpretation of actions that did take place, he
can be more vulnerable to becoming convinced of the interrogator’s or
accused’s versions of the events. Gisli Gudjonsson has reviewed evidence
that “memory distrust” plays a significant role in causing false confessions
of the type where the suspect comes to believe incorrectly that he did commit
the crime.131 If the accused’s memory is significantly impaired by alcohol,
this mechanism of false confession may become more likely.
This source of uncertainty may also play a role in a suspect’s seeming
“confession” to the accuser in the context of pretext calls made by the accuser
at the behest of police investigators, and designed to elicit incriminating
statements.132 Police often request that alleged victims of sexual assault
make such calls, allowing police to record them. The victim is to try to elicit
incriminating statements from the accused, to lead him to acknowledge in
some fonn that the encounter was non-consensual. She may tell him how
much he hurt her, ask him why he did that, talk about her attempts to resist,
and ask for an apology.133 If the accused is confused and doesn’t remember

129 Deborah Davis, Lies, Damned Lies, and the Path from Police Interrogation to
Wrongful Conviction 2 1 1 ,2 1 1 - 4 7 , in T he SCIENTIST AND THE HUMANIST: A FESTSCHRIFT IN
Honor of E lliot A ronson (Marti Hope Gonzales et al. eds, 2 0 1 0 ); Deborah Davis & Richard
A. Leo, The Problem o f Interrogation-Induced False Confession: Sources o f Failure in
Prevention and Detection, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY 4 7 , 58
(Stephen J. Morewitz & Mark. L. Goldstein eds., 2 0 1 4 ).
130 Davis & Leo, supra note 128, at 16-18.
131 Gisli Hannes Gudjonsson et al., The Role o f Memory Distrust in Cases o f Internalised
False Confession, 2 8 A p p l ie d C o g n it iv e P s y c h o l . 3 3 6 , 3 4 4 ^ 1 6 (2 0 1 4 ).
132 Deborah Davis & J. Guillermo Villalobos, Language and the Law: Illustrations from
Cases o f Disputed Sexual Consent, in T he Oxford H andbook of Language and Social
P sychology 438, 445 (Thomas M. Holtgraves, ed. 2014).
133 Id.
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clearly, he may acquiesce to the claims of the accuser to avoid conflict in the
absence of real memory of what she suggests.
G. THE PROBLEM OF SOURCE MONITORING: WHERE DID THIS
“MEMORY” REALLY COME FROM?

The images that one develops in the process of planning what to say
during an event, or in the process of thinking, talking, or answering questions
about the event later, can be confused with reality. So can “facts” and
interpretations encountered after the event. The real source of the image (the
memory) can be one’s own imagination or someone else’s recounting or
suggestions, but one might misattribute it to something actually experienced.
This, in essence, is the problem of “source monitoring”: that is, incorrect
understanding of where the memory really came from.134
As we have shown, the memory may have been altered or added to
through normal processes of gist-consistent drift, or through the various
sources of auto-suggestion, imagination, motivation, and external suggestion
reviewed above. However, a final source of memory intrusion can be
important for sexual assault cases.
Did 1 Actually Say/Do This or Just Think About It? Sexual interactions
can involve intense emotions, and many thoughts and feelings are never
expressed to the other party. In an interaction where the woman, for example,
feels distress, does not really want to have sex, and is not enjoying it she may
think about many things she would like to say or do to stop the interaction or
express her displeasure. But she may not overtly do so. As is often the case
with sexual or interpersonal matters, there may be many forces discouraging
expression of one’s true thoughts and feelings. But research on memory for
conversation has shown that false memories can occur for having actually
said what one actually only thought about, or had wanted to or intended to
say, but didn’t.135 An accuser may well falsely remember that she overtly said
or did things that she only thought about. Likewise, the accused may falsely
remember saying or doing things he did not. Each may falsely remember the
other saying or doing things they thought about, hoped for, or anticipated in
their imaginations.

Marcia K.. Johnson & Carol L. Raye, Reality Monitoring, 88 P sychol. Rev . 67, 82
(1981); Marcia K. Johnson et al., Source Monitoring, 114 P sychol. Bull. 3, 3—4 (1993);
Lindsay, supra note 119, at 58-59.
Deborah Davis et al., Memory fo r Conversation on Trial ch. 12, at 12-18 to -19, in
Handbook of H uman F actors in L itigation (Y. Ian Noy & Waldemar Karwowski eds.,
2005); Davis & Friedman, supra note 51, at 36-37.
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Conclusions
Obviously some accused people have knowingly and deliberately
violated an accuser’s unambiguous refusal of sex. But in many cases where
sexual assault is alleged, there is honest disagreement in interpretation of
consent between the parties. Difficulties in defining the nature of consent
itself, as well as in interpreting implications of the statements and actions of
each party, make the determination of whether consent was granted a difficult
task.136 These difficulties can become magnified when memory of the events
is necessary to their resolution.
Accusations of acquaintance rape have long been largely a contest of
credibility. Who is lying? Who is telling the truth? How can we tell? Our
analysis suggests that such cases are not just a contest of honestly, but are
often, instead, a contest of memory. Both may be “honest liars” who believe
earnestly in their accounts, unaware of the extent to which their own
memories deceive.

136 See generally A lan W ertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations (2003).
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